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Abstract:  
Food studies scholars have paid increasing attention to ‘financialisation’ within the food system 
as private financial actors have played a growing role in various facets of the sector in recent years. 
While there has been much attention paid to the implications of the greater role for financial actors in the 
food system, there has been relatively less attention paid to the ways in which these actors have 
historically interacted with it, in particular in relation to the role of the state in mediating agricultural 
finance. This article examines the long association between agriculture, finance, and the state. 
Historically, private capital has been reluctant to invest in agriculture without assurances and support 
from the state, and states have practiced varying degrees of regulation on private financiers in the sector. 
These trends have shaped the practices of contemporary financialisation. Although we recognize the 
systematic political project to reduce the role of the state in agriculture since the 1970s, these patterns 
persist and we ultimately argue that to understand the financialisation of agriculture, it is important to 
understand how the state has been a longstanding coupler between finance and agriculture. 
Key Words: Financialisation, Agricultural Finance, States, Financial Regulation, Commodity 
Markets 
The food and financial crises of 2007-08 spurred a renewed focus on the role of financial 
actors in the food system and in particular what is widely seen to be a ‘financialisation’ of food 
and agriculture (Fuchs, Meyer-Eppler and Hamenstädt 2013; Clapp 2012a). In particular, the 
growing role of private financial actors in supermarkets, land investment, commodity and value 
chains and the food system more generally have received increased attention (Burch and 
Lawrence 2009; Isakson 2014; Fairbairn 2014). The financialisation of food and agriculture is 
expanding into areas beyond the dominant agricultural export states such as Canada, the US, and 
the EU. International organisations are increasingly promoting ‘financial inclusion’ in many 
developing countries as a tool to support agricultural development and improvement (Global 
Partnership for Financial Inclusion and International Financial Corporation 2011; Taylor 2012). 
As a result, financialisation is being extended, albeit unevenly, to new global sites. Agrifood 
scholars often place this expansion within the realm of capitalist relations, and as an expression 
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of the contemporary food regime, which highlights the contradictions and logic of capital (e.g. 
Burch and Lawrence 2009; McMichael 2013). 
The attention to the greater role of private financial actors in the food system has brought 
forward important insights on the emergence of financialisation in relation to the dynamics of 
capitalist development. At the same time, however, there has been relatively less attention paid 
to the ways in which these actors have historically played a role in the food system and their 
relationship with the state (Clapp and Helleiner 2012). A longer view highlights the critical role 
of the state in mediating the relationship between agriculture and finance. Helleiner has used this 
longer view to show how states are critical to the globalisation of finance (Helleiner 1994). In the 
realm of food and agriculture, private capital has historically been reluctant to invest without 
assurances and support from the state, and states have practiced varying degrees of regulation on 
private financiers in the sector at different times.  
Over the course of the past century, states in both rich and poor countries have at times 
taken a proactive role in supporting farmers, a critical political force who were not always well 
served by private finance. In the first part of the 20th century, today’s advanced industrialised 
states established institutions to provide farm credit, offered financial support and enacted 
regulations designed to limit the influence of private financial actors specifically over 
agricultural commodity markets. Many of these types of measures were replicated in developing 
countries in the 1960s and 70s. In recent decades, with the rise of the neoliberal economic model 
that both states and private financial actors supported, many states have scaled back the 
protections and institutions that supported farmers and relaxed regulations that once reined in 
private financial actors in the sector. A number of states have also begun to invest in agriculture 
via private financial markets and new financial tools.    
This article outlines the contours of these historical trends and discusses their 
implications for present-day financialisation in the food sector. In the first section, we examine 
the role of the state as provider of agricultural credit for production and stable institutions for 
agricultural marketing. In section two, we highlight the role of the state in regulating private 
financial actors in agricultural commodity exchange markets. The third section looks at the ways 
in which these state-backed institutions and regulations have been re-shaped by states in recent 
decades, giving the upper hand to private financial actors in the agricultural sector. It is 
important to recognise the state’s role as a regulator and in shaping institutions for finance, even 
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if that role has been heavily influenced by private financial actors themselves (Barth, Caprio and 
Levine 2012). We argue that the state’s role in these different trends over time has important 
implications for the practices of contemporary financialisation. Whereas the state has taken 
explicit measures to ensure that agriculture was supported by finance at various times, more 
recently states have instead ensured that financial markets were supported by agriculture. The 
state, through its various interventions at the intersection of agriculture and finance, has shaped 
the conditions that today make agriculture an attractive site for investment by private financial 
actors. This shift has had important consequences for farmer livelihoods and agricultural 
sustainability. It remains to be seen whether agriculture will remain attractive to private financial 
investors as the state institutional legacy weakens and market turmoil continues apace.  
 
Early Approaches to Agricultural Credit and Marketing 
Historically, the modern state in rich countries has played an important role in creating 
institutions to support industrialised models of agriculture1 (Chang 2009; Friedmann 1982; 
Finegold 1982; Gilbert and Howe 1991). At the same time, agrarian movements have pushed the 
state to develop unique forms of financial regulation and legislation in the US and Canada 
(Carney 2011; Prasad 2012; Sanders 1999; Winson 1992). Since the early 1900s, agricultural 
economists have consistently highlighted the unique requirements of capitalizing agriculture. 
Farms are risky financial investments in comparison to other economic sectors such as 
manufacturing or services. Consequently, private capital has been reluctant to invest without 
assurances from the state such as contract enforcement, bankruptcy laws and state-backed 
collateral. Governments in Europe, for example, stepped in to provide financial support for 
farmers in the form of credit institutions starting in the 19th century, which spread to the US and 
Canada in the early 20th century (Prasad 2012). In addition, states provided a constellation of 
price and income supports, export trade financing and other subsidies to agriculture. In this way, 
the state mediated the development of financial services for agriculture through state-influenced 
financial markets to keep commodity markets stable; to provide credit and cooperatives for 
farmers; and to operate marketing boards that stabilised farmers’ incomes and in turn credit-
worthiness.  
                                                          
1 See Gilbert and Howe (1991) for an explanation of how state institutions such as the US Department of 
Agriculture contributed to reinforcing and privileging class relations. The result is support for agriculture was 
varied and structured along class, race and gender. 
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States implemented formalised policies for agricultural credit to encourage commercial 
agriculture. For example, the US state supported industrial agriculture which was premised on 
farm mortgages aimed to provide capital for the purchase of inputs and equipment (Fitzgerald 
2003).  While not unheard of, private banks typically had little interest in agricultural finance in 
the early 1900s (Wolff 1910), and states became in effect a lender of last resort and set up 
agricultural finance institutions such as the Canadian Farm Loan Board in 1927. The US 
government established the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916 and created Federal Land Banks, 
which turned farm ownership into collateral for mortgages. The state thus played a key role in 
providing agricultural credit and capital to farmers, and importantly, the state also protected 
banks and finance by preventing foreclosures and other losses on loans (Coleman and Grant 
1998; Winson 1992).  
Other forms of agricultural credit provision also relied on state involvement. While the 
state limited banks’ operations with anti-trust acts and placed restrictions on their involvement in 
commodity markets, credit unions and other cooperative endeavours did not face the same 
restrictions. In Europe, cooperatives and credit unions were established by agrarian interests to 
finance and support farmers (Chang 2009; Booth, 1928). In the US and Canada, cooperative 
marketing organisations and credit unions were actively supported by farmer groups who 
pressured politicians to enact state regulations and provide credit (Booth 1928; Winson 1992).  
Agricultural commodity trade expanded as exporting countries marketed grain surpluses 
around the globe through export financing and subsidies. Canada and Australia established 
marketing boards to manage commodity trade of grains, in part to restrict the manipulation of 
grain markets and to provide stable prices and orderly marketing for exports, while also offering 
credit to importing countries (Turner 1949; Grogan 1948). Farmers and commodity trading 
interests of exporting countries benefitted from these supports, but farmers in importing 
countries had to compete with ‘dumped’ commodities, which were sometimes given in the form 
of food aid (Clapp 2012b).  
A number of events occurred during the 1980s-1990s that brought an end to the relatively 
stable post WWII commodity markets. The International Commodity Agreements began to 
unravel along with many state marketing boards and trading enterprises. The commodity 
agreements were established to secure stability in commodity markets after World War II (Corea 
1991), and marketing boards helped to provide orderly and stable marketing of agricultural 
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commodities. In addition, the end of the Soviet Union opened up space for new market 
arrangements. At that time and the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund pressured 
countries to adopt structural adjustment policies which ended or curtailed state support of 
agriculture such as the subsidisation of inputs and credit and the disbandment of state marketing 
boards (Clapp 1997). Critics claimed that the subsidy programmes were inefficient, and 
ultimately harmed small farmers (Bates 2005).  
 
Regulating Finance and Commodity Exchanges 
The link between financial investors and trade in agricultural commodities has a long 
history. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries commodity exchanges created fungible 
agricultural commodities through a combination of technological innovation and state and 
market regulation (Cronon 1992). Futures exchanges for agricultural commodities were 
established in London in the eighteenth century and in the US in the nineteenth century in part as 
an outcome of globalised trade. These markets provided a means by which buyers and sellers of 
contracts could purchase and sell agricultural commodities for delivery at a date in the future, 
and could hedge their risks against the uncertainty of agricultural production and long-distance 
trade. Over the course of the mid to late nineteenth century, the practice of agricultural futures 
trading for grains became widespread in the US and later in Canada.  
Private speculative capital has long been active in agricultural commodity marketing and 
trade, even prior to formalised commodity exchanges, and in turn it has been a contested site. 
Speculation is a trade based on the prediction of price movements with the uncertain possibility 
of a reward. As a result, ‘futures’ trading has been likened to gambling. However, proponents 
state that commodity exchanges centralise and organise markets, commercialise agriculture and 
provide services such as price information, and risk protection (Hieronymus 1977; Irwin and 
Sanders 2012). 
Farmers and farmer organisations have historically been distrustful and highly critical of 
commodity exchanges because non-agricultural interests have used futures to manipulate prices 
and markets. Taking these concerns into consideration, several US states had banned futures 
trading outright in the late 19th century. But despite some curbs on financial speculation in 
commodity markets, futures trade grew and eclipsed the physical trade of commodities in centers 
free of restrictions such as Chicago (Cowing 1957). Financial speculators could trade a contract 
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many times over without taking delivery of the underlying commodity, for a small portion of its 
value. This practice continues today. Futures contracts, for example, can be secured with bonds 
which represent a fraction of the value, as low as 3-12 percent, and as such a large amount of 
commodities can be controlled with very little capital (CME Group n.d.). Consequently, futures 
markets are highly leveraged. 
Commodity exchanges have been highly contested sites that have drawn the interest of 
agrarian political forces and the state. The US government regulated commodity exchanges in 
the early twentieth century in order to reduce the chances for market manipulation by private 
actors. The US Grain Futures Act of 1922 and the 1936 Commodity Exchange Act were key 
pieces of legislation that sought to rein in financial speculators in agricultural markets. The Grain 
Futures Act required all futures transactions to take place on approved exchanges, and outlawed 
manipulation of the market. Large market traders were required by law to report daily on their 
market positions, which helped to curtail manipulation and increase transparency on futures 
markets. The Commodity Exchange Act limited the number of futures contracts that speculators 
were legally allowed to own at any one time. The 1933 Glass-Steagall Act regulated banking and 
bank speculation, including their involvement in commodity markets. The aim of these various 
regulations was not to outlaw financial speculation on these markets, and indeed agricultural 
‘end users’ that traded on these markets for hedging purposes – primarily grain traders, farmers’ 
co-operatives, food processors and large ranchers – were exempted from these regulations. 
Rather, the regulations sought to prevent ‘excessive’ speculation that might result in market 
manipulation and sudden sharp price shifts (Clapp and Helleiner 2012). 
Commodity exchanges drew little interest from critical food studies scholars after World 
War II because they were highly regulated by the state and agricultural exporting states were 
providing marketing support through various state marketing institutions and programmes. 
Proponents claim that during this time commodity exchanges faced ‘near extinction’ (Irwin 
2012: np) as a result of this regulation. However, a number of regulatory changes, starting in the 
1970s marked the revival of commodity exchanges and the start of a ‘golden age’ for futures 
markets (Irwin 2012: np). 
 
States and the Reformation of the Agriculture-Finance Sphere  
Although the intention of the above state interventions was to support agricultural 
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development broadly, these measures in practice often favoured large-scale farmers and 
agricultural trading interests, the latter of which have played a complex role as both farm 
interests and financial players. More recently, there has been a systematic reduction in the role of 
the state in the agricultural finance sphere that has benefited private financial actors and larger 
farming interests at the expense of small-scale farmers (Fairbairn 2014, Isakson 2014). The most 
visible of these changes was the reform of government-run marketing boards which have been 
effectively privatised, including in Canada and Australia as well as in many developing 
countries. Most experts expected that with the state marketing boards out of the way, the private 
sector would step in to set up new marketing arrangements such as country specific agricultural 
commodity exchanges. Thus far, there has been little uptake. Banks and financiers were reluctant 
to fund the export of commodities without the state-backed institutions securing the loans in 
developing countries that lost their marketing boards (Varangis and Larson 1996). In addition, 
the privatization of the Australian Wheat Board, and more recently the Canadian Wheat Board, 
has meant that farmers who previously counted on the marketing board to help market grain are 
now expected to turn to commodity exchanges and large grain traders for marketing assistance 
and risk management (Cryderman, 2013). In turn, there are indications that small and mid-size 
producers will lose with these new marketing arrangements (Magnan 2011) 
State-backed credit provision has also undergone change in recent decades. Rich 
countries have continued to support agriculture through a variety of programmes including 
providing credit when private capital avoided the risk of agricultural investment. However, there 
are shifts such as Farm Credit Canada aligning credit provisions with private lenders in the 1980s 
and borrowing from financial markets rather than relying on the Federal government (FCC 
2010). In the US, private financial institutions and actors are taking a greater role in the provision 
of farm credit (Briggeman 2011). In developing countries, private financial actors are still 
reluctant to provide credit to farmers, although there is encouragement from states for them to do 
so (Sachs et al. 2004; Dercon 2005; Barnett, Barrett and Skees 2008). International development 
agencies and lending institutions have developed programmes to encourage private finance to 
support agriculture and boost ‘financial inclusion’. These projects include structured trade and 
value chain financing (Miller 2011; McMichael 2013), programmes to encourage the reform of 
collateral laws and land titling (World Bank 2012) and microfinance (Aitken 2013). While not as 
visible as state marketing institutions, these programmes rely on the state to provide regulations 
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that support credit and debt such as providing legal frameworks to secure private property for 
collateral.  
Before structural adjustment programmes were widely adopted in the 1980s-90s, state-
marketing boards in developing countries would often provide credit to manage commodity trade 
risk. Financing commodity trade and commodity-related projects exposes the lender to price 
risks, since the borrower’s ability to repay the loan largely depends on future commodity prices. 
It is risky because volatile commodity prices can mean that the value of a shipment can change 
dramatically between when the commodities are sold and when they are received. As the state’s 
role in commodity trade shifted with structural adjustment, the risks remained and private capital 
was unwilling to step in. Commodity exchanges, in theory provided derivative instruments such 
as futures contracts, which could be used to manage these risks. The World Bank encouraged 
governments to access to derivative markets and risk management tools in order to ‘solve public 
sector problems,’ explaining how a handful of developing states used commodity derivatives. 
Mexico, for example, set up a state agency to hedge commodity prices on the New York Cotton 
Exchange (Larson, Varangis and Yabuki 1998: 2). The offering of such advice by multilateral 
aid agencies shows how states began to look to new kinds of financial instruments to manage and 
facilitate commodity marketing problems. However, commodity exchanges have high 
transaction costs (IFC 2011), which means only organizations and groups with large amounts of 
capital can benefit from participating in these marketing arrangements.  
The shifting regulatory context for finance in recent decades also had implications for 
agricultural commodity trading, bringing lighter regulations and more harmonisation between the 
US and the EU. Although tight regulations on the agricultural commodity futures trade had been 
in place in the US for over 50 years, those rules were relaxed in the 1980s and 1990s, enabling 
banks to increasingly sell new financial products linked to agricultural commodities (Ghosh 
2010; Clapp and Helleiner 2012). Banks requested and were granted ‘no action letters’ that 
enabled them to exceed previously set position limits, which enabled them to sell new financial 
derivative products ‘over the counter’ (OTC) (Clapp and Helleiner 2012). The Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act of 2000 explicitly prohibited the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, the US regulatory body that oversees commodity exchange markets, to regulate 
OTC derivatives (Tett 2009). This change brought the US regulatory approach more into line 
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with the European regulation of commodity markets, which only had light regulations that also 
did not oversee the OTC markets (Tilburg and Vander Stichele 2011). 
With the implementation of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, 
commodity exchanges have grown into global corporations with a significant reach into 
emerging economies’ markets. Commodity exchanges were initially member-led discrete 
associations. Now they are publically traded, consolidated corporations. For example, the CME 
Group now includes the Chicago Board of Trade, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the New 
York Mercantile Exchange and the Kansas Board of Trade, which it acquired since 2007. The 
consolidation shows how anti-trust laws that once restricted this kind of market dominance have 
been set aside by the state.  
The combination of relaxed position limits and exemption of OTC derivatives from 
reporting fuelled the creation of new financial products after 2000 that burst onto the scene 
without regulators being aware of its size and scope. Indeed, there has been massive growth of 
agriculture-based derivatives compared to the previous 70 years of regulation. The total assets of 
financial speculators in agricultural commodity markets increased from US$65 billion in 2006 to 
some US$126 billion by early 2011 (Worthy 2011: 13). Similar to the late nineteenth century, 
fictitious or paper trade of futures contracts have exceeded the physical trade of commodities by 
many times. In the US wheat futures market, for example, financial speculators’ share of the 
trade increased from 12 percent in the mid-1990s to 61 percent in 2011 (Worthy 2011: 13). In the 
coffee market it is estimated that 1kg coffee is traded 8000 times over in speculative trade 
(Breger Bush 2012: 40). Investors also bought into new financial investment products linked to 
farmland acquisition (See Fairbairn, this issue). 
Heightened and excessive speculation in the sector can result in increased volatility in 
agricultural and land prices, which results in hardships both for consumers and for farmers, the 
latter of which do not necessarily benefit when prices rise, because volatility introduces greater 
uncertainties and complicates planning (FAO 2011). Investments linked to farmland acqusition 
in developing countries have been associated in many cases with loss of land rights for small 
scale producers and ecological impacts of the introduction of large-scale industrial agricultural 
production, as we have seen in the case of land acquisitions for biofuel operations (Vermeulen 
and Cotula 2010; McMichael 2010). Large agricultural trading interests, however, have benefited 
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from these changes, as they increasingly joined financial institutions in offering agricultural 
commodity derivative products to investors (Murphy et al. 2012).  
The main investors in these new agricultural commodity derivatives products are large-
scale institutional investment funds that are seeking to gain exposure to commodity markets. 
Governments have taken a role in such investments via pension funds and sovereign wealth 
funds, alongside private investors such as insurance companies, mutual funds and foundation 
endowments. Large-scale investors such as these tend to make long-term passive investment 
decisions that do not require active management. Changes in investment by pension funds are a 
prime example of the ways in which these financial investment shifts have affected agriculture, 
and highlight the complex role of government involvement. According to some estimates, the 
agricultural investments of pension funds are around US$320 billion, up markedly from the 
US$6 billion these investors held in agriculture in 2002 (Buxton, Campanale and Cotula 2012: 
2). The Canada Pension Plan, for example, began an agricultural investment programme that 
targeted farmland in Canada, the US, Australia, New Zealand and Brazil (CBC 2013). This 
programme was part of a larger effort to move the fund away from ‘safe’ government and 
treasury investments into riskier private investments that included agriculture. As other countries 
started to shift their public pension funds away from state-secured investments toward private 
investments (Anon 2014), a new kind of ‘state’ investment is capitalizing on agriculture (Buxton, 
Campanale and Cotula 2012).  
The flurry of private financial investments in the sector in recent decades as a result of 
the changes will likely have long lasting consequences for agricultural and food system 
sustainability. The state’s earlier policies underpinned and secured credit provision for 
agriculture as a long-term investment, recognising the important role agriculture played in state 
development. But contemporary states are now underpinning and securing credit for financial 
actors operating in the agricultural sector, themselves seeking benefits alongside financial 
interests. This shift only reinforces the short-term incentives that typically drive decisions in the 
financial sector and which often run counter to long-term sustainability goals (Helleiner 2011). 
More strictly regulated financial markets on their own are not necessarily sufficient for 
sustainability in the agricultural sector, as the ecological effects of agricultural industrialisation 
in the 20th century have shown (Weis 2010). But weak financial regulations that encourage 
private speculative investments in the sector have spurred appropriation of new landscapes into 
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industrial production and the externalisation of ecological and social costs that are associated 
with it, which only exacerbate efforts to promote sustainability in the sector (see Clapp, 
forthcoming). Greater oversight of financial market activity in the sector is an important 
component of building more sustainable agrarian livelihoods and food systems, alongside 
stronger policies for environmental protection. 
 
Conclusion  
In this current period of heightened financialisation, much of the attention has focused on the 
role of private financial actors and their rationale for engaging more actively in the agricultural 
sector. Financialisation is seen as part of the logic of capitalism as it seeks to reap profits on a 
range of economic activities, including agriculture. As we have shown in this article, putting this 
current period into a longer historical context reveals that the state has played an important role 
in shaping the contours of contemporary financialisation of food. The modern state in rich 
countries was instrumental in creating institutions to support agriculture, including the provision 
of credit and other supports to farmers who otherwise would not have received it, albeit 
unevenly. States also actively regulated the actions of private financial actors in commodity 
markets as a means to protect farmers and stabilise incomes. Recent decades have seen the 
earlier institutions reshaped, alongside the deregulation of finance in ways that have important 
implications for food and agriculture. Although it appears that finance is operating on its own 
capitalist logic, it is important to recognise that its context for doing so has been strongly shaped 
by the state. 
The mediating role of states between finance and agriculture over the course of the past 
century has in many ways laid the groundwork that made the sector particularly attractive to 
private financial actors in recent decades. The state, in other words, was crucial in creating the 
conditions not only for stable markets, but also for the industrialisation of agriculture and the 
development of global agricultural value chains by securing commodity trade. Once these trends 
were firmly established, private capital became more interested in investing in all stages of the 
agricultural sector, rather than simply capitalizing on commodity market price shifts at the very 
end of the production process.  
States may have been influenced by private financial actors in recent decades, but they 
also played a key role in encouraging those actors to take a lead and this shift has resulted in a 
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number of consequences. The stability that states brought to the sector via credit provision and 
regulations has been removed just as states handed private finance the freedom to play a bigger 
role in the sector. The recent volatility on agricultural markets can be seen in this context, and it 
is unclear whether private financial actors will remain interested in the sector given the high 
degree of risk and uncertainty that encouraged states to become more involved a century ago. It 
is entirely possible that the current market volatility and degraded ecological base will lead 
private financial actors to ultimately withdraw from the sector, and the state may be called upon 
to step back in to stabilise it. The longer, historical view provided here gives some perspective, 
and enables us to see that it is not necessarily inevitable that private sector actors will voluntarily 
seek to dominate this sector if the state does not create the conditions that make it profitable, not 
just in the short term, but also in the long term. States may have shaped the interests of private 
finance in the sector, but with the withdrawal of the state, that interest may fade in the context of 
market turmoil and ecological degradation.  
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